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CROSS-EXAMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
By
Jonathan R. Vaitl*
I.  

INTRODUCTION

Cross-examination in International Arbitration is written by Kaj Hobér and
Howard S. Sussman.1 The authors sought to provide lawyers with a fundamental
understanding of the basic principles of cross-examination in international arbitration.
The authors begin by distinguishing cross-examination in international arbitration from
cross-examination in domestic arbitrations and trials. Thereafter, the authors explore nine
basic principles of cross-examination that lawyers can build upon through experience.2
Although the authors explain the nine basic principles in detail, they also illustrate the
principles with actual and hypothetical cross-examination exchanges.3 The authors note
that the examples are not meant to illustrate a perfect cross-examination, but to offer
“insights and clues into what works, what doesn’t, and why.”4 Ultimately, crossexamination is a circumstantial skill – not a script to follow at all times, but a skill
developed and dependent on the particular facts and circumstances of a case.5 The
authors provide a starting point and a way of thinking about cross-examination from a
strategic point of view.6
The book is a useful guide for practicing attorneys or even law students who
desire to learn more about cross-examination, both generally and in the context of
international arbitration. The examples, both real and hypothetical, effectively
contextualize the principles and allow readers to visualize themselves in the role of the
cross-examiner, which is itself a valuable practice. The authors walk readers through each
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phase of a cross-examination, beginning with how to prepare and develop a theory of the
case, how to ask relevant questions, and how to maintain control of the witness. By
providing advice about developing a theory of the case, and even devoting a chapter to
the importance of maintaining self-control, the authors do more than just discuss crossexamination; they provide advice for being an effective lawyer. At times, the book
becomes repetitive, certain subsections appear to have little relation to the chapter in
which they appear, and some of the separated principles – for instance, using leading
questions and asking simple questions – could have been collapsed into a single principle
to avoid redundancy. However, the book does not fail because of these flaws, as I
perceive them. The authors still pack a significant amount of useful advice into a short
book, making it well worth the read.
II.  

OVERVIEW

Cross-examination in International Arbitration is divided into three parts
addressing three fundamental themes: international arbitration is distinct from traditional
litigation in common law or civil law countries; cross-examination, at its core, is based on
controlling the witness; and cross-examination elicits facts to support the attorney’s
closing argument.7 The book offers a short guide, at only 156 pages, and focuses most of
the attention on the second theme, control of the witness.
Part One addresses the first theme – a description of arbitration and its differences
from litigation – in five chapters. Chapter One provides a brief introduction that sets
down the rationale for the book, namely, that the attorney’s goal is to win the case for his
or her client, and cross-examination is merely a tool for achieving that goal.8 Chapter
Two aims to describe the legal nature of international arbitration, including the doctrine
of separability, compétence de la compétence,9 and arbitral awards and their
enforceability.10 Beginning with Chapter Three, the authors describe the stages of a
typical arbitral proceeding and the types of permissible evidence.11 Chapter Four
addresses general considerations for cross-examination in international arbitration,
including the multiculturalism inherent to international arbitration.12 Finally in Chapter
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Five, the authors preview the fundamentals of cross-examination that they explore more
fully in Part Two.13
Part Two lays out the nine basic principles of cross-examination in international
arbitration. Chapter Six advises attorneys to be fully prepared to cross-examine a witness,
which starts with attorneys knowing exactly what they want from the witness.14 In
Chapter Seven, the authors explain the importance of brevity and keeping crossexamination to a maximum of three points.15 Chapter Eight highlights the value of
leading questions,16 and Chapter Nine recommends short, clear, and simple questions.17
In Chapter Ten, the authors exhort readers to listen carefully to a witness’s answers to
determine a witness’s motivation for evading the question.18 Chapter Eleven cautions
attorneys not to ask witnesses to agree with conclusions.19 In Chapter Twelve, the authors
further warn readers not to let witnesses repeat their prior direct testimony,20 and Chapter
Thirteen states that the cross-examiner should not let the witness explain an answer
because doing so runs the risk of the witness saying something damaging to the
attorney’s client.21 Finally in Chapter Fourteen, the authors counsel readers to maintain
self-control in order to maintain control over the witness.22
Part Three offers the authors’ concluding words in which they underscore the
value of experience in developing the skill of cross-examination.23 In this part, the
authors identify the three underlying themes to the book.24
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III.  

PART I – BACKGROUND

A.  The Law Surrounding International Arbitration
The authors start Part One by discussing the law of international arbitration.
Arbitration is a means of resolving disputes between contracting parties who, through
their contract, consented to the use of arbitration as an alternative to a judicial
proceeding.25 The consensual nature of arbitration distinguishes it from judicial
proceedings, but like a judicial trial, the arbitral proceeding exists because of, and will
depend on, the law of the nation in which the arbitration takes place.26 However, the
parties retain significant control over how the arbitration will proceed, including the
manner of handling evidence and the ability of parties to amend current claims or
introduce new claims.27 In this sense, the arbitration agreement between the parties, more
than the national law where the arbitration takes place, governs the proceeding and grants
authority to the arbitrators to hear the dispute.28 The arbitration agreement, then, also
serves as a bar to resolving the dispute through litigation unless certain exceptions
apply.29
Two key, interrelated doctrines serve as cornerstones of international arbitration:
the doctrine of separability and compétence de la compétence.30 Under the doctrine of
separability, an arbitral clause stands as its own, independent contract, and a party who
can invalidate the main agreement has not necessarily invalidated the arbitral clause.31
25
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Id. at 8-9. One exception is if the subject matter of the arbitration is not arbitrable under the pertinent
national law. The agreement also will not bar litigation if one of the parties has waived the arbitration
agreement, for example, by not objecting to the other party pursuing its claim in court, or if the agreement
itself is not valid as a contract. A final exception concerns the validity of the arbitration agreement under
contract law. A contractually invalid agreement will not prevent one of the parties from seeking resolution
through the courts. Id.
30

Janet A. Rosen, Note, Arbitration Under Private International Law: The Doctrines of Separability and
Competence de la Competence, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 599, 609 (1994).
The competence de la competence doctrine is considered a corollary to the separability doctrine. The
separability doctrine, which espouses the autonomy of the arbitration agreement, creates a need for the
arbitral tribunal to have the jurisdictional competence to rule not only on the main contract’s validity but
also on the validity of the arbitration agreement. Under this analysis, the competence of the arbitral tribunal
to rule on jurisdictional challenges is a corollary to the doctrine of separability establishing the autonomous
nature of the arbitration agreement.
Id.
31
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The principle of compétence de la compétence authorizes arbitrators to determine the
validity of an arbitration agreement and to determine whether the tribunal has jurisdiction
to hear the dispute.32 The authors point out that, although arbitration decisions in most
jurisdictions are binding and final, certain countries allow parties to challenge decisions
regarding the arbitrators’ jurisdiction.33
When a tribunal determines the validity of an arbitration agreement and their own
jurisdiction, the arbitration proceedings may commence, and the arbitrators will render an
award that is presumed to be final and binding unless the parties state otherwise in the
agreement.34 An unsatisfied party, however, may challenge the award in court, albeit on
procedural grounds and not on the merits.35 In some cases, parties can even seek
nullification of an award.36 Barring any impediments to an international arbitration
award, the award will be enforceable internationally.37
B.  How International Arbitration Works
Arbitration generally follows a series of stages, unless the parties dictate
otherwise in their agreement.38 First, the party making a claim will initiate arbitration by
submitting a written request, which includes the party’s appointment of an arbitrator,
either to the other party to the agreement or to an arbitration institution.39 The other party
will reply to the request for arbitration and appoint its own arbitrator, at which point the

international arbitration because it prevents a party from avoiding arbitration by invalidating the main
agreement. The same claims that can invalidate a contract, such as coercion, incapacity, or illegality, can
also invalidate an arbitration agreement.
32

Id.

33

Id. at 10.
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Id.

35

Id. See also Rémy Gerbay, Is the End Nigh Again? An Empirical Assessment of the “Judicialization” of
International Arbitration, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 223 (2014) (stating that an apparent increase in the
“judicialization” of international arbitration reflects the increasing sophistication and complexity of
disputes submitted to international arbitration, as compared to the early days of international arbitration).
36

HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 11. Nullification requires the party seeking nullification to prove
that an arbitration agreement is not valid, the party was not given due notice, the dispute or the arbitrator’s
decision was not within the scope of the arbitration agreement, or the makeup of the arbitral tribunal did not
accord with the agreement. A court can also nullify an award if the court finds that the subject matter of the
dispute was not arbitrable or that the award offends public policy.
37
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Id. at 14. See also Kenneth F. Dunham, International Arbitration Is Not Your Father’s Oldsmobile, 2005
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rules, which are available for download on the institutions’ websites).
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two arbitrators will agree on a third arbitrator to serve as chairperson of the tribunal.40
Once the parties have selected the arbitrators, the claimant sets forth the issues in dispute
in its “statement of claim,” and the other party submits a “statement of defense” that will
also include any counterclaims the party wants to make.41 Both sides then have the option
of making additional replies and addressing procedural issues.42 The parties will then
participate in a hearing, introducing testimonial and documentary evidence, as well as
making their arguments, which may be followed by a post-hearing briefing period.43 At
the conclusion of all presentation of evidence and argument, the arbitrators will render
their decision as a written award.44
The initial statements submitted by the parties generally contain three parts: (1)
each party’s prayer for relief, (2) the legal grounds for the claim or defense, and (3) the
facts and circumstances supporting each party’s claim or defense.45 The prayers for relief
precisely set forth what the parties want and serve as boundaries on the arbitrators’
authority to rule;46 however, the scope of the arbitration agreement restrains the scope of
the parties’ prayers for relief.47 The legal grounds will relate to both the specific legal
injury, such as a claim of breach of a specific contract provision, as well as the law
supporting that claim, such as specific statutes or case law.48 The parties must also state
the relevant facts with a significant amount of detail so that the arbitrators have a
complete picture for making an accurate decision.49 If the respondent chooses to make a
counterclaim, it will generally raise the counterclaim in its statement of defense, but both
parties often have the ability, unless their agreement forbids it, to augment or amend their

40

Id.

41

Id. at 15.

42

Id. at 15. Other procedural issues may include “questions relating to jurisdiction, production of
documents, amendment of claims or presentations of new claims, and the determination of the applicable
law.”
43

Id.
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HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 15-16. The authors point out three ways in which the above
procedure differs from traditional civil litigation. First, the proceeding usually does not include a discovery
period before the hearing. The authors caution that the lack of discovery period does not mean that the
parties do not share a voluminous amount of information, but that it does put the onus on the parties and
their counsel to conduct their own investigations and resources in developing their cases. Second, the
authors highlight the absence of evidentiary rules in international arbitration. The result is that most
evidence will be admitted, “even if the party opposing its admission claims that it is forged or stolen or
otherwise inauthentic or tainted.” Finally, the arbitrators are not presumed to know the law the way parties
to litigation would assume the court knows the law. Id.
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initial claims.50 Not all arbitrations will include post-hearing briefs, stopping instead after
the conclusion of closing arguments;51 however, parties frequently have a final
opportunity to present their arguments and facts before the arbitrators make their
decision.52
The hearing itself consists of the parties presenting evidence in the form of
witness testimony and documents. The way that parties present evidence can vary from
one arbitration to another, owing to the parties’ ability to control the arbitral
proceeding.53 Party autonomy for controlling the arbitration ultimately results in the
arbitrators having limited authority to exclude evidence, unless the evidence is
“manifestly irrelevant to the dispute or…is not timely presented.”54 Arbitrators typically
have no subpoena power and do not administer oaths.55 However, despite their
limitations, arbitrators determine how to weigh the evidence presented, and crossexamination can serve as a potent way of achieving the truth in the absence of oaths.56
Arbitrators rely on their right to allocate weight to the evidence presented by the parties
as a justification for admitting potential hearsay evidence or even evidence claimed to be
“forged or stolen or otherwise inauthentic or tainted.”57 In addition, the relevance of
evidence is often unknown until the parties have presented all their evidence, resulting in
the arbitrators favoring admissibility over exclusion.58 The hearing will typically involve
testimony from fact witnesses, expert witnesses, or both.59 Typically, in international
arbitration the witnesses will testify through written statements, rather than oral
testimony.60
50

Id. at 19.
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Id. at 20.
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documents they are ordered to produce. Id. By contrast, under U.S. federal law, arbitrators do have
subpoena power. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2016); see also THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL 9192 (3d ed. 2012).
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Id. at 26. Fact witnesses “are expected to provide facts, not to set out arguments about what those facts
mean. Arbitrators, as a rule, do not take kindly to witnesses who try to plead the case of the party that called
them.” Id. By contract, expert witnesses “do not testify about the facts of the dispute but rather about the
significance, in the expert’s field of expertise, of facts the expert deems relevant to the dispute.” Id.
60

HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 26-27. Written statements will usually be prepared by counsel and
allow the arbitration to proceed more efficiently because the statements will alleviate the need for much, if
any, oral testimony, which is often limited to cross-examination. The arbitrators, in addition to counsel, may
ask questions of the witnesses. Id.
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C.  The Role of Cross-Examination in International Arbitration
In an arbitration, the arbitrators serve as both judge and jury.61 More importantly,
unlike domestic trials, the arbitrators may be from different nations among themselves
and among counsel, adding a multicultural aspect not as common outside of international
arbitration.62 The multiculturalism introduces not only the possibility of arbitrators who
speak different languages natively, but also arbitrators who come from different legal
traditions.63 Counsel must ensure that the cross-examination is “succinct and efficient”
because the arbitrators will likely come from varied backgrounds, have significant
experience, and will probably be accomplished lawyers in their own right.64
The authors identified nine principles, fully discussed below, to effective crossexamination that seek that “succinct and efficient” goal. The authors describe the
rationale of cross-examination as reducing “to the extent reasonably possible, the adverse
impact of the witness’s direct testimony on your client’s case.”65 With this purpose in
mind, counsel should consider whether to cross-examine, whether the direct testimony
was sufficiently damaging, and whether cross-examination is likely to mend the damage
without making it worse.66 The nine principles discussed below will guide the attorney in
making that decision and, if he chooses to cross-examine, in conducting a succinct,
effective cross-examination.
IV.  

PART II – THE NINE BASIC PRINCIPLES

A.  Basic Principle One: Be Fully Prepared
Good cross-examination begins with a well-prepared attorney.67 The authors
define full preparation as having a thorough knowledge of the facts, a mastery of the law,
61

Id. at 29.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 30. The authors also note:

The absence of national rules of evidence also means that some conduct which is customary, or even
obligatory, under some national systems has no place in international arbitration. As an example, the
practice of ‘putting’ a contention to a witness need not be used in international arbitrations, and its use can
often be counter-productive because one or more of the arbitrators may find it uncongenial or offensive or
time-wasting.
Id.
64

Id. at 31.

65

HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 32.
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Id. at 33.

67
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and a plan for each witness the attorney intends to question.68 Good preparation, though,
goes back further to the attorney’s theory of his client’s case.69 The authors write that the
attorney’s theory of the case should direct everything the attorney does during the
arbitration.70 Practically, the authors recommend drafting a closing argument early and
“working backwards” to figure out how to achieve the objective of persuading the
arbitrators to accept the attorney’s theory of the case.71 An attorney should only proceed
with cross-examination if it is necessary to support the attorney’s theory of the case.72
Keeping in mind the role of cross-examination as a tool to elicit the framework of the
theory of the case and the risks involved in questioning the witness, the authors state, “the
first rule of cross-examination: Don’t.”73 If the attorney can glean the same evidentiary
support from other methods, such as exhibits to written witness statements, then the
attorney should avoid cross-examination.74
If the attorney decides to cross-examine the witness, the attorney must consider
each witness as just “one piece of the jigsaw puzzle,” ask the right questions, and only
ask as many questions as are necessary to achieve the attorney’s objective for that
witness.75 The general rule for asking the right question is to know the answer before
asking the question.76 The authors also suggest deciding on a safe final question for the
witness, then a safe initial question, which provides the attorney with a framework for the
cross-examination.77 The sequence of the middle questions can follow a chronological
timeline, but the authors believe that the chronological approach is a mistake in
commercial disputes, which occupies most of international arbitration.78 The parties will
68

Id. at 49-50.

69

Id. at 50. Hobér illustrates this principle with the “successful gambit” of defense attorney Johnny
Cochran in his representation of O.J. Simpson: “‘If the glove don’t fit you must acquit.’ The glove referred
to was a blood-soaked glove that was found at the murder scene but was too small for Simpson’s hand and
thus showed his non-involvement – which was the defence’s [sic] theory of the case.” Id.
70

Id. (stating that the closing argument is the best time to convince the arbitrators of the attorney’s theory
of the case).
71

Id. at 50-51 (stating that a closing argument should do three things: explain the theory of the case,
persuade the arbitrators toward the attorney’s theory, and dissuade the arbitrators from siding with the
opponent’s theory).
72
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Id. at 52.
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Id. at 55 (stating two rationales for the general rule: (1) “an unexpected answer may well destroy your
plan for the cross-examination” and (2) “cross-examination is not the place to find out further facts about
the case”).
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Id. at 55.
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have already covered the chronology of events in their written statements, making this
approach redundant and a waste of time.79 Instead, the authors recommend a thematic
approach and organizing questions logically within each theme.80 The authors also
suggest a “decision tree,” which identifies alternative answers to each question and
prepares follow-up questions.81
B.  Basic Principle Two: Be Brief
In keeping with the idea that each witness is only a piece to a larger jigsaw
puzzle, the authors recommend making a maximum of three main points per crossexamination.82 The main points to make depend on the attorney’s theory of the case.83
The authors suggest four reasons for keeping cross-examinations short:
[T]he longer the time you spend on cross-examination, the greater
the risk that things will go wrong – that is, that the witness will say
things that will hurt your client’s case. A second reason is that a
brief, succinct, and focused cross-examination has a much better
chance of persuading the arbitrators of the point or points you are
trying to make. A third reason is that in international arbitration the
arbitrators are usually quite familiar with the relevant facts of the
dispute. This means that there is a serious risk that the arbitrators
will lose interest in a cross-examination which is unfocused and
long-winded. Yet a fourth reason is the risk that the arbitrators will
think you are wasting their time, and as a result will not only lose
interest but also become irritated at you, which will disadvantage
your client.84
The authors reiterate here that attorneys should only cross-examine a witness if they need
to and should not allow their clients to push additional questioning.85

79

Id.

80

HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 60.

81

Id. at 64 (stating, for example, “if the initial inquiry is ‘You did not sign the contract, did you?’, there
would be four main branches for each of ‘no,’ ‘do not recall signing,’ ‘not sure,’ and ‘yes I did,’ with
subsidiary branches descending from those main branches”). See also DAVID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES
ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL § 12-22 (5th ed. 2014) (suggesting a chart of subjects with
introductory questions for each section).
82

HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 66.
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Id.
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HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 67.

85

Id. at 70.
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With respect to experts, attorneys must be careful in cross-examination not to
attack the expert witness on the expert’s field of expertise because the attorneys, in most
cases, will not have sufficient knowledge to do so effectively, even with the education
provided by the attorneys’ own experts.86 Instead, the authors suggest several lines of
questioning: (1) the expert’s qualification to provide an opinion, (2) the factual basis
informing the expert’s opinion and whether additional or different facts would change the
expert’s testimony, (3) the intellectual basis of the expert’s opinion, (4) whether the
expert’s testimony is consistent with the standards or opinions of other experts in the
same or a similar field, and (5) personal characteristics that call the expert’s credibility
into question.87
C.  Basic Principle Three: Use Only Leading Questions
A leading question “expressly or implicitly suggests the answer sought.”88
Leading questions make sense in the context of cross-examination because leading
questions do not elicit new information, which comports with the goal that the attorney
will rarely use cross-examination to acquire new facts. Instead, leading questions ask a
witness to agree or disagree with what the authors describe as a “short, simple,
unambiguous statement of a single, simple fact.”89 The authors caution that the attorney
needs to be fully prepared and know what the witness’s truthful answer will be.90 In
practice, a proper leading question will evoke either a yes or no answer and not
encourage the witness to expound on his or her own narrative.91
D.  Basic Principle Four: Use Only Short, Simple, Unambiguous Questions
In addition to brevity, discussed in Subsection B above, a good cross-examination
will be simple.92 Clear, short, and simple questions will enable the attorney to exercise
86

Id. at 72-73 (although the expert witness section appears in the “be brief” chapter, the content of the
section bears little relevance to brevity and, in fact, includes a lengthy cross-examination excerpt as an
illustration).
87

Id. at 73.

88

Id. at 78.

89

HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 79.

90

HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 79.
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Id. The authors naturally talk about the need to keep witnesses to yes or no answers that prevent
witnesses from telling stories. Id. That is also the basic thrust of Principle No. 4, using short, simple,
unambiguous questions. The two principles seem, to me, sufficiently related, and instead they could be one
cohesive principle. In fact, they seem more like two parts of an overall principle regarding the form of the
questions an attorney should ask. Teasing them out into two separate principles seems unnecessary to me
and adds to the feeling of redundancy throughout the book.
92

Id. at 87.
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better control over the witness and will make it more difficult for the witness to answer
evasively.93 The authors offer as a rule of thumb that a question should be, at most,
twenty-five words and should address only a single fact.94
Lack of simplicity creates a myriad of potential problems during crossexamination:
The witness may not understand the question and may ask you to
repeat it. The witness may take part of the question and use it to
launch into a speech about something you don’t want to hear or
have the arbitrators hear. The witness may try to draw you into a
debate about the meaning of your question. Any of these things
may cause you to lose control of the witness and of the crossexamination. If the witness uses the poorly worded question as a
platform from which to launch into a speech, even worse things
may happen.95
Accordingly, the authors advise against compound questions that pile question upon
question and suggest sticking to simple, single-fact questions that are easy to
understand.96 Simplicity also means stripping questions of unnecessary words, such as
adjectives or imprecise language.97
E.  Basic Principle Five: Listen to the Answer
Effective cross-examination is not just asking the right questions in the right way
but also carefully listening to the witness’s answer and understanding “the meaning and
significance of what the witness says.”98 Close listening serves two purposes: (1)
ensuring that the witness actually answered the question and (2) determining if the
answer requires a change of course in the direction of the cross-examination.99
93

Id.

94

Id. at 87-88. The authors also recommend using the witness’s surname to “remind the witness that the
arbitrators are focused on the witness as an individual with a reputation and position to protect and are not
just engaged in an abstract intellectual enterprise.” Id. See also Gary S. Gildin, Cross-Examination at Trial:
Strategies for the Deposition, 35 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 471, 494 (2012): “Asking a leading question alone
will not prevent the witness from launching a narrative that revisits the direct examination. During crossexamination, counsel must abide by a second tenet regarding the form of the question – each leading
question should pose only one additional fact to be admitted or denied.”
95

Hobér & Sussman, supra note 1, at 89.

96

HOBÉR & SUSSMAN, supra note 1, at 91.

97

Id. (stating, as an example, a comparison between “[Question]: The ring cost $50,000, didn’t it?” and
“[Question]: The ring was very expensive, wasn’t it?”).
98

Id. at 104.

99

Id. at 104.
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The authors identify four categories of answers: (1) a simple “yes,” (2) something
more than a “yes,” (3) an honest witness who does not answer, and (4) a “witness with an
agenda” who fails to answer.100 The first category, while seeming to be exactly what the
attorney would want, still demands a close ear because the manner in which the witness
gave the simple “yes” answer can be revealing.101 The second category triggers the same
analysis as the first category.102
The “failure to answer” categories lead to an even more complex analysis of the
witness and his or her motivations. As the authors point out, “Your understanding of why
the witness did not answer will also provide some idea of what dangers may be
encountered as the examination proceeds.”103 If the attorney thinks that the witness was
being honest but just did not answer the question, then the answer would fall into the
third category. In that case, the witness “will usually work with you to get an answer to
the question and so you could proceed on the assumption that the witness is willing to do
that.”104 A good test is to restate the question. If the witness answers it properly, then the
attorney’s impression was accurate; however, if the witness still fails to answer the
question, then the attorney can be “reasonably confident … that the witness is not willing
to be cooperative, and that the approach to the witness should therefore be changed.”105
An evasive, uncooperative witness, giving an answer falling into category four, can still
support the overarching aim of the cross-examiner, though, because the arbitrators will
observe the repeated evasions and may use that as a basis for discrediting the witness.106
F.  Basic Principle Six: Do Not Ask for Conclusions
Ultimately, the attorney wants the arbitrators to draw inferences from the crossexamination, which the attorney will reiterate and argue in closing arguments; however,
during cross-examination, the attorney must be careful not to ask the witness to agree
with those inferences or conclusions.107 The purpose of cross-examination, as stated
above, is to “diminish the adverse impact of the witness’s testimony on your client’s
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case,” not to make an argument.108 Veering away from facts and toward conclusions
encourages the witness to narrate more and may result in testimony that does not progress
the attorney’s objective.109
The authors acknowledge that the temptation to ask for a conclusion can be
overwhelming and difficult to avoid, especially when the witness agrees with a series of
facts put forward by the attorney.110 As a practical example, the authors describe a
scenario where the witness admits he wrote certain documents, “signed them, had read
them before signing them, and understood and agreed with their contents.”111 None of
that, however, guarantees that the witness and the attorney will agree about what the
documents mean, which would call for a conclusion.112
Asking for a conclusion usually falls under the umbrella of asking “one question
too many.”113 The above example illustrates this principal, as the cross-examiner likely
had an effective series of questions by getting the witness to admit to writing, reading,
and signing the document. Asking for a conclusion is unnecessary and goes one question
too far. The authors suggest that knowing when to stop begins with knowing what the
attorney wants to achieve in the cross-examination – the final question that was prepared
ahead of time – and stopping when the attorney has “scored a significant ‘hit.’”114
G.  Basic Principle Seven: Do Not Let the Witness Repeat the Direct Testimony
Given the basic premise that cross-examination attempts to neutralize damaging
portions of a witness’s direct testimony, it logically follows that a cross-examiner should
not allow a witness to repeat direct testimony unless the attorney determines that it will
advantage his or her client.115 The authors suggest that the most effect way to minimize
the risk of a witness repeating his or her direct testimony is to use “short, simple,
unambiguous leading questions limited to a single, simple fact [that] will call for simple
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answers and will tend to limit the witness’s ability to repeat things from the direct
testimony.”116 The authors acknowledge, however, that repetitions may happen and, in
such a case, recommend ignoring the repeated testimony and continuing with the line of
questions.117
The most common occasion when an attorney may want the witness to repeat
direct testimony is when the witness makes a statement that is inconsistent with a prior
statement made by the witness.118 The authors note that surprising a witness with an
inconsistent statement rarely happens in international arbitration, but understanding how
to handle such a situation is worth exploring.119 For an inconsistency to be useful on
cross-examination, it must make a discernible difference to the issues before the
arbitrators, and it must be something that the witness will not be able to explain.120 An
effective cross-examiner can use an inconsistent statement for two possible purposes: to
attack and destroy the witness’s credibility or to imply that the arbitrators should take the
prior inconsistent statement, and not the direct testimony, as the truth.121
H.  Basic Principle Eight: Do Not Let the Witness Explain
The cross-examining attorney must maintain control of the witness at all times,
which includes preventing the witness from explaining answers or asking questions.122 In
some instances, a witness will attempt to explain an answer because the question is
defective and cannot be answered with simply “yes” or “no,” but in other instances, the
witness will likely have an agenda.123 When the attorney thinks the witness may have an
agenda, an effective technique is to ask the witness, “Did you understand my
question?”124 If the witness answers affirmatively, the attorney can ask why the witness
did not answer the question; if the witness responds that he or she did not understand the
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question, the attorney can ask a series of questions to achieve the same result, being
careful to avoid the supposedly incomprehensible question.125
Ultimately, the authors state that the attorney will not stop a witness from making
a speech if the witness is determined to do so.126 When a witness makes a speech, the
attorney has some options: (1) the attorney can simply ignore the speech, (2) the attorney
can use the speech as a springboard for further questions that will help the client’s case,
or (3) the attorney can repeat the question and ask the witness to answer it again.127 The
authors caution against inciting further speeches by attempting to reformulate the speech
in the attorney’s words.128
I.   Basic Principle Nine: Exercise Self-control – Do Not Argue, or Get Angry,
with the Witness129
The best cross-examiners will not only maintain control of the witness, but will
practice self-control as well.130 When the lawyer loses his or her composure, the witness
gains freedom to say whatever he or she wants.131 In addition, the arbitrators will see the
lawyer’s loss of control, which damages the attorney’s persuasiveness.132 Crossexaminers must always be careful not to argue with the witness or get angry with the
witness.133 The lawyer must “be perceived as trustworthy and credible if [he is] to do as
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good a job as you can for [his] client, and these behaviors contribute to – may even be
essential for – [his] being perceived that way.”134
V.  

PART IV – CONCLUSION

Cross-examination in International Arbitration focuses on the practical building
blocks of effective cross-examination. Although the authors contextualize their principles
in the setting of international arbitration, the principles are equally valid in domestic
arbitration and even trial courts. The authors provide concrete advice and amply illustrate
their principles with both real and hypothetical cross-examination exchanges. The authors
effectively fleshed out their nine basic principles, including: (1) being fully prepared; (2)
being brief; (3) using only leading questions; (4) using short, simple, and clear questions;
(5) listening to the answer; (6) not asking for conclusions; (7) keeping the witness from
repeating direct testimony; (8) preventing the witness from explaining answers; and (9)
maintaining self-control.
As noted above, the authors, at times, included sub-sections within certain
chapters that did not seem to fit, which can make the book seem cobbled together.
However, the book has an overall feel of a collection of proverbs, which makes the
misplaced sub-sections tolerable, despite the authors’ intent to organize it into basic
principles. I found it more bothersome that the authors chose to tease out their advice into
nine principles, where they probably could have collapsed some into a single principle.
For instance, I did not think the authors needed to break apart the type of questions into
two principles: leading questions and short and simple questions. However, again, that
was only a minor issue and not something that impaired my ability, as a reader, to gain
important and useful knowledge.
I also found it strange and disconnecting that some of the sample crossexaminations failed to fully illustrate the advice the authors were giving. In some
instances, the authors even acknowledge that the illustration demonstrated one principle
but violated others. Perhaps this, itself, is a useful lesson: that no cross-examination will
be perfect but can still be effective. However, as a reader, I wanted the illustrations to
give me a glimpse of how to do what the authors suggest I do, and when they fail to
capture all but one or two principles, I am left wondering what a fully realized crossexamination looks like.
Beyond cross-examination, the book also provides an excellent framework for
good lawyering, plain and simple. Principles such as being fully prepared, carefully
listening to what the witness says, and maintaining self-control all extend outside the
context of a cross-examination. A good lawyer will be prepared, will listen to his or her
clients and adversaries, and will practice self-control and civility in a multitude of
situations. With that in mind, the book becomes even more useful than the authors
apparently intended, especially for law students and new lawyers. Even with the flaws I
mentioned above, the book offers a treasure trove of excellent advice, all in a quick and
easy read. I fully recommend this book for both law students, young attorneys, or even
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seasoned attorneys who want to freshen up their skills in the courtroom or arbitration
proceeding.
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